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C O N S C I E N C E  ( R U L E )  U T I L I T A R I A N I S M  
A N D  T H E  C R I M I N A L  L A W  
I N T R O D U C T I O N  
In this paper I wish first to contrast a society's morality with its 
legal system, and then to explain (1) whether  and in what way a 
conscience (rule)-utilitarian theory o f  morality has implications 
for what a morally acceptable system of  criminal law might be 
and (2) what a utility-based criminal law would look like, as 
compared with the present criminal law in the U.S. 
Begin with an explanation of  "a person's morality". I propose 
we explain this as comprising (1) his intrinsic aversions to doing 
certain types of  things (like telling lies), (2) his disposition to feel 
guilt or remorse if he acts contrary to these aversions, (3) his dis- 
position to feel disapproval - indignation, coolness - toward other 
persons who  do (provided, in the cases o f  (2) and (3) there is 
no "excuse" - see below), (4) along with a belief that these atti- 
tudes are justified in some appropriate way. On  this view o f  
"morality;' If  a person says, "A is morally wrong," he is expressing 
an unfavourable syndrome of  this sort toward actions o f  the kind 
A. A person's total syndrome of  this sort, toward actions, is his 
conscience. 
T h e n  a person holds a normative rule-utilitarian theory about 
morali ty if  he affirms roughly (there are variations I and I shall 
1 Among those who roughly hold a rule-utilitarian theory of some sort: 
Francis Hutcheson, Bishop Berkeley, J. S. Mill, J. O. Urmson, Kurt 
Baler, J. D. Mabbott, Stephen Toulmin, R. F. Harrod, Kai Nielsen, A. 
MacBeath, C. A. Campbell, Marcus Singer, P. H. Nowell-Smith, John 
Harsanyi, and (probably, at least at one time), Wilfrid Sellars, early John 
Rawls, may be mentioned. Some of the above might object to being so 
classified, and doubtless there should be additions. 
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develop the concept more  fully later) that a morality is really 
justified if and only if the teaching and prevalence o f  it (its typical 
conscience) in a society would maximize the general well-being. Notice 
that conscience-utilitarianism in this sense is a thesis about morality: 
one might also be a utilitarian about justified 2 systems o f  criminal 
law, holding, in part, that a justified law's declaring certain types 
o f  action as "offenses" and requiring and implementing punishing 
them in a certain way must maximize public benefit. But whether  
a system of  laws is morally justified if and only if this is true may 
be a different matter. 
A conscience-utilitarian about morality need not hold a utili- 
tarian thesis about justified law; and, o f  course, the reverse is also 
true. 
Noth ing  has been said about how a conscience-util i tarian 
thesis about justified morality might be supported, or even about 
the reasons for explaining "morality" or "morally right" as I have 
done. 
What  is the actual morality o f  a given person, or the typical 
or average morality o f  a whole  society, is relatively easy for a 
sociologist to determine. Not  so for a determination o f  what kind 
o f  morality is justified, which requires philosophical argument.  
Conscience-utilitarianism as a theory is a development o f  this. So 
the truth of  conscience-utilitarianism as a normative thesis about 
morality cannot be determined by the methods o f  sociology. 
Explanation o f  "the criminal law in the City o f  Ann Arbor" is 
in this respect much the same as "the actual morality o f  this person 
(or society)" It can be determined empirically by lawyers or legal 
scholars. It consists o f  the statutes, applicable in Ann Arbor - federal, 
state, or local, as interpreted by the courts - statutes (and some lesser 
practices) which identify which kinds o f  behavior are "offenses" 
and which specify the penalty affixed to each type o f  offense, 
2 How one should explain, or defend, a conception of "justified" legal 
systems is a further question, which I do not address. "Morally justified 
legal system" I do explain in what follows. 
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including, of  course, the range of  penalties among which the courts 
have a discretion to choose. The criminal law in the city o f  Ann 
Arbor is thus an observable fact. Not  so the justifiable, or the morally 
justifiable legal system, although whe ther  a given legal system 
maximizes public benefit may be so, at least in a large part. 
I. M O R A L I T Y  V E R S U S  LEGAL STATUTES 
What  is the connect ion between something being actually con-  
demned as immoral in a given society, and its being illegal in that 
society? The answer to this question is not quite simple. 
(1) There are evidently some things that are contrary to a person's 
or a society's morality, and which are not illegal. For instance, a 
given social morality may condemn telling harmful lies, but that 
may not be a criminal offense. Again, failure to make gifts for 
charitable purposes, say to the truly needy, may be morally con- 
demned, but it surely does not infringe the criminal law (although 
making a gift will result in a tax deduction). In some states there 
are "good Samaritan" laws, requiring a motorist to stop and give 
aid if he observes an accident or distress; but such laws are not  
universal, and they are very specific about what  must be done 
and when. 
The  reason for this difference is doubtless that the law as we 
know it must operate by statutes, procedures, and relatively severe 
sanctions. Any moral appraisal of  the law must take this fact into 
account. 
(2) There  is a part o f  morality not  ment ioned  above: that 
some acts give the agent some personal satisfaction, and are 
admired/praised by the society in which the act was performed - 
"supererogatory" acts, ones that are viewed as socially desirable 
but not morally required although they would be required but 
for the cost to the agent. For instance, a physician might go into 
a plague-infested area, to give aid, when  morality would hardly 
declare he is morally obliged to go, at a risk to himself. 
The criminal law does not have such a department of  praise; it 
is limited to condemnation and penalties. 
68 R. B. Brandt 
(3) A person cannot be penalized for an offense if  the law 
prohibiting that kind o f  action has not been publicized in advance. 
This is in general not  true for morality; it is supposed that at 
least every adult knows the difference between right and wrong 
without  the benefit o f  a specific announcement  beyond ordinary 
educational processes. (Children, however, are morally excused 
when  they cannot have been expected to know; and if a chain o f  
reasoning intervenes between the presumedly widely known prin- 
ciples o f  morality and a particular action, even an adult may not 
be supposed to be familiar with this and may not be condemned 
for an infraction, especially on matters about which there is moral 
disagreement.) Roughly, the difference with the law is that it is 
not supposed that any special announcement  must be made in order 
for a person's action to be within the scope o f  morality. 
A reason for this requirement  o f  the law is made clear by a 
famous example, o f  a law in Los Angeles requiring anyone con- 
victed of  a felony in another state to register with the L.A. police 
within a week after arrival in Los Angeles. How could new arrivals 
be expected to know of  this law? The law was declared uncon-  
stitutional. It is hardly morally justifiable to punish someone for 
doing what a reasonable person would not  believe to be illegal. 
There could hardly be public benefit in enforcing such a law. 
(4) More  importantly, the law gives very little place to indi- 
vidual reflection in determining what is the law. In partial contrast 
to what has just been said, morality gives a large place to personal 
reflection in deciding what in particular is moral. If  an individual 
thinks through his principles that bear on a certain case, and con- 
cludes he ought to do so-and-so, it is thought  this is what  he 
morally ought to, or at least morally may, do - roughly "follow 
conscience" (although a person's reflection and principles o f  con- 
science may so diverge from what we think of  as decent and rational 
that his results throw moral doubt  on him and his th inking/  
conscience, rather than underwriting his conclusion - we may think 
a person was rationalizing: doing what he really just wanted to 
do). Thus, in matters o f  morality the individual agent is ideally 
in a position a bit like that o f  an appellate judge in courts o f  law 
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- a judge who may decide on an interpretation of  the law in view 
o f  (roughly) what he supposes is the benefi t-serving purpose of  
the adoption of  a statute and is coherent with the themes of  law 
as a whole.  So, in morality, the individual is given leeway in 
deciding what moral principles require for a given case. We shall 
see that this is necessary at least in a conscience-utilitarian type 
o f  morality, for the manifest moral duties o f  a person do not identify 
what is to be done when there is conflict o f  moral rules - the agent's 
thinking is necessary to decide this. But  the individual's reflec- 
tion does not have this standing in the law: proponents o f  a "right 
to life" are not  free to disobey a court  order not  to attack or 
even to obstruct  the business o f  a center providing abortions, 
whatever their moral commitments.  In this, the stand of  the law 
is largely right: if  acts are criminalized only in cases where there 
is largely consensus about their harmfulness, the criminal law may 
have a helpful teaching function. Still, we should not draw this 
distinction too sharply; the law itself recognizes moral commitments 
as affecting legal duties in some cases, e.g., scruples about serving 
in the armed forces in time o f  war. There is a large literature 3 on 
this. There is also, in the law, scope for moral judgment  of  agents 
o f  the law: o f  pol icemen about  when  to make an arrest, o f  
prosecutors about w h o m  to charge and for what offense, o f  judges 
about  what  sentence to pronounce within certain limits, and so 
o n .  
(5) To  continue with a somewhat  similar point, an action is 
not illegal if  the law is not clear and explicit (with some reserva- 
tions about future adjudications). But in morality, there are various 
levels of  salience. Some types o f  action have been  well-impressed 
on consciences since childhood: not telling lies, not stealing, not 
injuring other people. We automatically feel guilty if  we knowingly 
do one of  these things. (W. D. Ross claimed that there are just seven 
self-evident principles of  obligation.) Other matters are not so clear. 
3 See, for instance, Kent Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and Morality (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1987). 
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How much o f  my income should I give to help the needy? If  my 
son needs money, am I free to give to him what otherwise might 
have gone to help the truly needy? Should I support a tax code 
which provides for promoting equality o f  well-being? (In thinking 
about these issues, a moral person may even find she must delib- 
erate about what someone's "well-being" consists in.) One  may 
think these issues through, and come to a conclusion which one 
then adopts into one's scheme of  thinking about obligations. 
Thereafter one is inclined to feel guilty or disapprove o f  others 
on these scores. In this sense such conclusions become a part o f  
one's "conscience" or "morali ty".  But one might not, at least 
initially, feel guilty about acting contrariwise, as one would about 
telling a lie, and one would be unlikely to feel indignant at someone 
else for not acting in conformity with one's newly-endorsed prin- 
ciples (like one favoring equality o f  incomes). In this sense the 
salience of  different moral "rules" may vary. (In a different sense, 
we might say that one moral rule is "stronger" than another  if  
the aversion to contravening it is stronger, the guilt feelings at 
contravention are more pronounced, and the disapproval of  those 
who infringe is more forcible.) There is no parallel to this com- 
plexity in the law, although one law may in a sense be stronger if  
the penalty for infraction is more severe, and, o f  course, one pro- 
hibition o f  the law may be well-known and other laws seem arcane. 
It is true that some laws are just trivial, but, even if so, they are 
still the law (although police/prosecutors may choose to ignore 
them). 
But it would be a mistake to draw the line between morality 
and the law too sharply. 4 In some cases, other than those already 
ment ioned,  moral considerations enter explicitly into the law. 
Consider, for instance, the excuse of  duress in the law, e.g., that 
4 This was a recurring thesis in the work of Conrad Johnson. See his 
"Toward a Cautious Return To Natural Law: Some Comments on Moral 
and Legal Obligation," Western Ontario Law Review 4 (1975): 31-49; 
"Moral and Legal Obligation," Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975): 315-33; 
and Moral Legislation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
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an unlawful act is excused if  done in response to a serious threat 
(to self or others close to one) by another  person. The  Model 
Penal Code states that an unlawful act is excused if done in response 
to a threat such that "a person of  reasonable firmness in his situ- 
ation" would be unable to resist. But  what does this clause mean? 
It seems that what a person o f  "reasonable firmness" would not 
resist comes down to something that a person o f  good character 
would not resist. As George Fletcher has remarked, a decision on 
this "is patently a matter of  moral judgment  about what we expect 
people to be able to resist in trying situations. ''5 It is assumed that 
a "reasonable man" would not kill in response to a slap on the 
face. A more general and more important point: we may also say 
that a person is not thought guilty o f  a crime unless in the total 
context it is reasonable to believe he would not have done what 
he did if his character, not only his moral motivations, but  his law- 
abidingness, had not been below the standard we expect o f  decent 
people. So, i f  someone does something illegal from inadvertence, 
or nonculpably mistaken beliefs about the situation, etc., he will 
not  be penalized by the law. The  same thing, o f  course, is true 
of  morality: a person will not be the object o f  moral indignation 
for what he did if  his action did not manifest a defect o f  char- 
acter. (In bo th  cases, a partial justification o f  sanctions, moral 
condemnation or legal punishment, is that the agent's motivations 
are defective and need improvement.) 6 
(6) The law is more concerned with the actual consequences 
of  one's act than with one's intentions and motives (although the 
presence of  intent is normally a condition of  having committed a 
crime). Thus, if I strike a hemophiliac, quite ignorant o f  his physical 
5 George Fletcher, Rethinking the Criminal Law (Boston: Little, Brown, 
and Co., 1978), p. 804. See also his "The Individualization of Excusing 
Conditions," Southern California Law Review 47 (1974): 1269-309. 
6 See my "A Utilitarian Theory of  Excuses," Philosophical Review 78 
(1969): 337-61, and "A Motivational Theory of Excuses in the Criminal 
Law" Nomos 27 (1985): 165-200, both reprinted in Morality, Utilitarianism, 
and Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
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condition, and with no intention to cause serious injury, morality 
will accuse me o f  nothing more than an assault. In the law, if  he 
dies, I may be guilty of  a serious form of  homicide. Or, if I am 
involved in a robbery and in a subsequent exchange o f  gunfire 
someone is killed, even if I do not shoot at anyone and do not even 
have a weapon, I may be guilty of  murder. (Morally, I am surely 
condemned only for participating in a robbery.) All "strict liability" 
offenses are of  this sort. Here the law seems open to moral criti- 
cism, as it stands. 
(7) Any disparity between the requirements o f  law and those 
o f  morality may be partially bridged for some people, by the reflec- 
tion that one has a prima facie moral obligation o f  some weight, 
to obey any law if  it has been adopted in a democratic society, 
and like most such laws is apt to be socially beneficial. This is 
controversial, and it may be held that there is no moral obliga- 
tion at all to obey a law, if  doing what  the law requires is not  
morally obligatory, independently o f  the law. 7 We shall see whether  
such a view is an implicate of  a conscience-utilitarian theory o f  
morality. But, even if it is, the weight o f  any prima facie obliga- 
tion remains to be determined, and obviously it may not be easy 
to identify what is one's real obligation, everything considered. One 
might think that the force o f  such a prima facie obligation is just 
that, when  one is not  aware o f  counter ing considerations, one 
should automatically obey the law, assuming one knows what it 
is. So, faced by a "Stop!" sign, one should stop unless one has 
thought o f  countering considerations (like not wasting time and 
gasoline by stopping when  there is clearly no intersecting traffic 
in sight, but one might wonder  if  there is even a prima facie 
moral obligation to obey a law forbidding pedestrians from crossing 
7 For discussion of the complications, see Donald Regan, "Law's Halo," 
Social Philosophy and Policy 4, 15-30; also M. B. E. Smith, "Is There a 
Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?" Yale Law Journal 82 (1973): 
950-76; Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1979), pp. 233-49. 
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a street against the lights, as was enforced in California and 
Washington, if one can see there is no traffic coming.) Moreover, 
in contrast to any prima facie obligation, it may well be thought 
to be immoral, everything considered, to obey a certain law, e.g., 
requiring serving in the armed forces in a war in which one thinks 
one's country ought morally not to be engaged. There is a large 
literature on this conflict. 8 
II. T H E  C R I M I N A L  LAW A N D  
C O N S C I E N C E - U T I L I T A R I A N  M O R A L I T Y  
With  these distinctions made, there is a question o f  how much 
difference there is between the actual statutes and careful enforce- 
ment  of  the law including its sanctions, and the requirements of  
at least the form o f  conscience-utilitarian theory about morality 
which  I tend to support  - that an act is morally wrong  if  and 
only if it is contrary to a morality (conscience) the teaching and 
prevalence of  which would maximize the public good. 
In the case of  the law, some authoritative body, with the power 
to enforce its dicta, has declared that any person who  has been  
shown, in an appropriate proceeding,  to have done something 
speci-fied by the statutes, as interpreted by the courts, will have 
imposed upon him some unpleasant penalty such as a fine, a duty 
to perform some communi ty  service, to undergo some treatment 
like behavior therapy, or, much worse, be confined to a penal 
institution for a specified period of  time (with possibly some dis- 
cretion in the hands o f  a parole board, about  how much the 
specified period may be shortened). All this is an act o f  govern- 
ment  - indeed, one which  brings harm to some people, the 
convicted criminals - ,  and, as such, clearly subject to appraisal by 
a correct morality (here supposed to be the one affirmed by the 
conscience-utilitarian theory). If  one holds the conscience-util i-  
tarian theory, one can say that the enactment or enforcement o f  
8 See, for instance, Kent Greenawalt, op. cit. 
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a law is not  morally right, if it contravenes the rule-uti l i tarian 
standard of  right action. 
There  is a compl ica t ion here, however. This rule-uti l i tarian 
theory about morality proposes that an act is wrong if a morality 
(so intrinsic motivations to avoid that sort of  action, gui l t / remorse 
feelings if one fails, and indignation, etc., toward others who  fail 
which in each case is without  an excuse) forbidding it - other things 
being equal - would  maximize public benefit.  This concep t ion  
seems to allow that the requirements  on  conduct  o f  even a 
maximally beneficial legal system need not  coincide wi th  those 
o f  such a morality. Suppose a total legal system is so devised that 
its operation will (or expectably will) maximize the public benefit, 
thereby conforming with the requirements o f  a utilitarianism (like 
Bentham's) about the law. Will its demands on action necessarily 
coincide with those o f  an optimal moral system? In the preceding 
section we have seen some disparities between morality and the law. 
For one thing, the law is necessarily a bit heavy-handed, requiring 
statutes, procedures, and (as things are) a rather restricted set o f  
sanctions such as impr i sonment .  Thus  it is quite clear that the 
law's declarations o f  offenses and its punishment  of  offenders can 
be inappropriate for many "morally wrong" actions, such as failure 
to give to charity, racist attitudes in interpersonal  relationships, 
failure o f  professors to prepare adequately and to grade equally, 
and so on, each such action justifiably arousing guilt-feelings and 
indignat ion o f  others ("justifiably" because, on  the conscience-  
utilitarian view, the motivations,  disapproval of  others, etc. will 
maximize public benefit). N o w  the Benthamite  utilitarian about 
law is not asking whether  moral sanctions etc., o f  certain actions 
will maximize public benefit,  but  whe the r  the total legal sanc- 
tions, including sentences o f  impr i sonment  and identification o f  
offenses and the procedures for assessing guilt, will maximize public 
benefit. Severe sanctions would  be out  o f  place for many moral 
offenses, and the sanctions of  morality (such as disapproval by others) 
would  doubtless not  affect many potential  criminals w h o m  the 
law would  like to deter. So, if we want  to morally appraise a 
criminal statute or the imposit ion of  a criminal punishment ,  we 
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have to take this larger picture into account.  It is one thing to 
say that a certain morality will maximize public benefit, and quite 
another thing to say that the operation of  a certain legal system will 
maximize public benefit as compared with other legal systems oper- 
ating with essentially the same restrictions. 
It seems, however, that a rule-utilitarian about morality will 
probably want to affirm a prima facie moral obligation to obey 
every law, if  it has been authorized by a democratic society and 
if, as a typical instance of  such laws, it is likely to maximize the 
general benefit. For the idea will be that support of  such a system 
by moral sanctions (moral rules) will do more good than by negative 
moral attitudes, or no attitudes, in the society; support o f  a demo-  
cratically enacted legal system may itself be expected to be 
instrumentally a good thing. Presumably legislators, although they 
may subscribe to no moral theory and may not be thinking about 
morality at all (although sometimes, e.g., when  voting about anti- 
abortion acts, they at least normally vote their moral commitments), 
vote for a law (etc.) mostly in the belief that law will do the best 
for the public well-being (in some sense of  "well-being") - unless, 
o f  course, they are thinking about re-election and think a vote 
for a certain law would help in this. So it may be hoped that, 
usually, laws are aimed to comport  with the utilitarian legal ideal 
- law and law enforcement  to maximize public benefit, and so 
far merit  a prima facie moral obligation to obey them. It is a very 
different question, however, whether  citizens have not a moral duty 
to do what they can to get the laws changed, in a direction more 
publicly beneficial. 
What  clear meaning can be attached, then, to a statement that 
a given part o f  a system of  criminal law is "immoral"? I suggest 
we can say this: the enactment, support, and implementation o f  a 
system of  criminal law are morally in the clear only if these are 
justified by a (conscience-utilitarian) moral standard, and only if 
a justified morality would approve o f  these things, taking into 
account the fact that a legal system is necessarily restricted in certain 
ways. So a justified morality, we may suppose, will condemn "cruel 
and unusual punishment" and will condemn enactment and imple- 
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mentation of  any legal system which does not. More  generally, a 
(conscience-utilitarian) morality will require of  a system of  criminal 
law that the punishments for certain offenses be ones that would 
approve themselves to optimal moral aversions/emotions including 
indignation, in view o f  the benefits o f  there being such moral 
aversions/indignations toward such punishments for such offenses, 
in the society, as compared with no such or different aversions, 
etc. Thus we can say that the enactment and implementation of  
a certain legal system is not morally in the clear unless, given the 
methods available to the law (punishments of  some sort) and its aim 
(reforming, but primarily maximizing the public benefit by deter- 
ring anti-social behavior),  it would  be approved by an optimal 
(conscience-utilitarian) morality. Manifestly some feature o f  a given 
system o f  criminal law could fail this test - for instance, i f  it 
manifestly ignores the well-being of  the convicted who are capable 
of  improvement by therapy and instruction as contrasted with being 
thrust into an unfriendly penitentiary in which they can learn more 
criminal ways from other inmates! 9 So, in the end, a conscience- 
utilitarian will think that a given system o f  criminal law is not "good 
morally", unless its enactment and implementation will meet this 
standard. Otherwise that law is just an arbitrary imposition, for 
no morally justified reason. (This is not to say that bad laws are 
not laws at all, as some "natural law" theorists may have main- 
9 The New York Times, Sept. 15, 1993, A-15, reports a 17-year-old 
(undoubtedly black) boy in Thomaston, Georgia, being sentenced to three 
years in prison for allegedly stealing (he had entered a school building 
without authorization and a box of ice-cream bars was found missing from 
the cafeteria) ice cream bars, after plea-bargaining with no advice from 
a court-appointed lawyer who was busy with another case. The legal 
system of Georgia of course does not mandate such a sentence in such 
circumstances, but it did permit it, and the operation of the system had 
that result. (As a result of  the efforts of the NAACP and newspapers, 
the boy, after ten days in prison, was released on $15,000 bail, for a 
new hearing.) I suggest that this sentence (and indeed probably the pro- 
ceeding) was outrageously immoral. What can be done to prevent such 
occurrences? 
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tained.) One  may naturally ask, however, how it could be that a 
legal system, with statutes and implementation intended by legis- 
lators to maximize public benefit, could possibly fail to meet the 
conscience-utilitarian moral standards. We must go into this. 
Compared with the appraisal required by legal systems, the job 
of  identification o f  morally permissible actions by a conscience- 
utilitarian moral system is relatively simple, despite what I have 
said about the role o f  personal reflections in morality, and various 
degrees o f  salience in moral principles. To explain this, however, 
we must go a bit beyond our initial description o f  "conscience- 
utilitarianism" as the view that a morality is correct if  its prevalence 
and teaching would maximize public benefit. Yet all the conscience- 
utilitarian moralist has to know, to determine whether  it is best 
for persons to have a certain level of  motivation in certain direc- 
tions, e.g., not  to steal, injure others, etc., is simply to know 
whether  there would be more public benefit if  such a rule were 
taught and widely prevalent, as compared with no rule at all or a 
somewhat different rule. Thus the major thing one has to deter- 
mine is whether  it would be better if  everyone, say, were motivated 
to tell the truth (with various exceptions), as compared with there 
being no rule o f  conscience on the matter. Or, for cases o f  con- 
flicts o f  motivation, one has to know whether  it is better for the 
public if  people are more motivated to tell the truth versus avoiding 
injuring others (to a certain degree). We hardly need a social science 
survey to determine this. As Bishop Berkeley (the first person to 
state explicitly an essentially conscience-utilitarian theory) wrote: 
The basic moral principles "to right reason evidently appear to have 
a necessary connection with the Universal well-being", l° The main 
themes in core morality will not  be hard to identify. The  main 
problem arises for cases for which  the main prescriptions give 
conflicting imperatives. For such cases we may have to decide 
(according to the conscience-utilitarian) which o f  the basic rules 
should have priority, or possibly decide that a more complex rule 
10 George Berkeley, Passive Obedience (1712), reprinted in Berkeley, M. W. 
Calkins, ed. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), p. 436. 
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would do better than either o f  the basic principles, in view o f  
prospective public benefit. (Morality also makes a distinction about 
which one o f  various failures to conform to morality is worse 
morally, to be more  strongly reprehended.  This order o f  moral 
badness will presumably reflect the order o f  priority about moral 
duties - whether  the obligation to do one thing is stronger than 
the obligation to do another. (Actually, things are doubtless a bit 
more complex, since the moral badness of  an act depends, in the 
total context,  on whe the r  the act shows that the agent's con-  
science is defective to a certain degree, insensitive to one or more 
obligations.) Here thought is necessary: Would it have better results, 
everything considered, if the one rule prevailed and was taught as 
having greater force, where there is conflict? Or  suppose there is 
reason to think that many people will in fact not follow the rule 
that seems best on this basis, possibly for the reason that they do 
not make the same judgments  about which  rule should have 
priority, or perhaps just because they are selfish. It is not  clear 
how much difference this should make. Even if there is a lot o f  
dishonesty in business, it would be recognized that it is a good thing 
for there to be a public standard o f  honesty, one that is argued 
for, for familiar reasons. It might be argued, that, in case o f  such 
conflicts, nobody will know what is agreed on and that there will 
not be a public standard; but at least it seems Berkeley was right 
that on the main items o f  a core morality there will not be dis- 
agreement, and we shall be able to predict, and count on, what a 
moral person will do, if  he is intelligent enough to follow reflec- 
tions about the public good. So, given a conscience-uti l i tarian 
theory, inferences as to what is morally required, from reflections 
on the probable impact o f  a specific i tem of  a morality on the 
benefits o f  the total system of  moral motivations, should not  be 
too difficult, or beyond the powers o f  thoughtful  people wi th  
normal experience with social living. 
Now one o f  the jobs o f  the conscience-utilitarian theory is to 
provide an appraisal o f  the actual system of  criminal law. That is 
not so easy, for reasons we have seen. For it requires the deter-  
mination o f  whether  society would be better off not only in view 
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of  the benefits o f  the law's prohibitions and sanctions, but also, in 
a secondary way, in view of  the benefit o f  people being morally 
motivated (etc.) to give the system support.  
The  major  problem about the morali ty o f  our  criminal  law, 
however, is not  in such a refined question as whe ther  morality's 
support  o f  a given legal system would  serve the public good  maxi- 
mally, but the simpler question of  which  system of  criminal law 
- or its statutes, procedures, and sanctions - would serve the public 
good  maximally. A partial answer to this quest ion is not  hard, 
since it requires only a decision about which  kinds o f  conduc t  
should be an "offense": deliberate killing, rape, theft, decept ion 
in business transactions, forgery, etc. The  law also has to decide 
the order  o f  badness o f  these offenses (which I have suggested 
also has to do wi th  morality), wh ich  in the case at least o f  the 
law means the relative magnitude of  the harm done to an individual 
or the public. But,  much  more difficult, it has to decide what  to 
do about t hem - i.e. what  penalty should be attached. This is a 
most serious, and also a very difficult question. 
In order to get a picture o f  the seriousness of  the problem, we 
must ask: What  sorts o f  punishments does the law actually mandate? 
Consider,  as an example o f  what  is actually done,  the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines (effective November  1, 1987). 11 This program 
lists 43 "offense levels" with prison terms varying from 0 months  
to life. T h e  more  interesting basic penalties, for a first offense, 
are: (1) murder,  life imprisonment;  unpremedita ted homicide,  10 
years; involuntary homicide (e.g., drunk driving), 6 to 15 months;  
(2) rape with force or threat, 6 years; statutory rape, 1 1/2 years; 
(3) kidnapping 3 1/2 years; (4) assault in tending bodily harm, 3+ 
years, increased to 4 or 5 if a firearm was used or serious injury 
caused; (5) robbery, 2+ years, increases to 4+ if injuries caused 
or large sum taken; (6) burglary o f  a residence, 2 years; (7) perjury, 
one  year; (8) various offenses wi th  smaller penalties up to one 
year: embezzlement  (more if a large sum), bribery o f  a witness, 
11 U . S .  Sentencing Commission, Supplementary Report, Washington, D . C . ,  
1987. 
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force or threats to suppress civil rights, blackmail, insider trading, 
fraud. (9) All attempts to commit  a crime, the same as for the basic 
offense. (This i tem may be strongly criticized, but I shall ignore 
it.) 
Further, i f  the normal sentence is not  more than six months 
imprisonment,  the judge has the discretion to substitute proba- 
tion (up to five years), during which time the individual may be 
required not to commit  another crime, to report regularly, possibly 
live at home and perform communi ty  services, etc. In the State 
o f  Minnesota probation is permissible when  the normal sentence 
is not more than two years. 
Moreover, the above sentences are for first offenses only. The 
listed prison terms are to be increased by approximately one-third 
for each previous conviction o f  a felony, perhaps because the indi- 
vidual is thought  to be more dangerous, more liable to commit  
another crime. (This view can reach absurdities: the Supreme Court  
refused to review the  case o f  Rummel v. Estelle; the defendant had 
been given a life sentence, as a third offender, for three crimes o f  
obtaining money under false pretenses, in the total sum of  $120.75.) 
Would it make a difference in morality if  an offense is a second: 
say, justifiably produce stronger guilt-feelings in the agent, stronger 
indignation by others? One  might think less o f  a second offender, 
since the second offense tends to show something about his char- 
acter; and hence predictive of  the future if  nothing is done; but 
morality is essentially about act-types, and a second offense is hardly 
an act-type, although on reflection one might conceivably think 
so and this determination might become part o f  one's conscience 
at a deeper level. 
Moreover, a judge is permitted to increase the normal sentence 
for various reasons: e.g., that the victim was vulnerable on account 
o f  age or physical/mental  condit ion,  or if  he was physically 
restrained. (Morality, which is not restricted by statutes, will regard 
these as different offenses.) On  the other hand, the normal sentence 
may be reduced if the criminal voluntarily surrendered to author- 
ities, made restitution, or assisted in recovering gains from the crime. 
(A conscience-utilitarian morality may regard these behaviors as 
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showing less defect o f  character than does the basic offense, and 
so deserving less reprobation.) 
What  sense can be made o f  this hotchpotch of  sentencing rules, 
other  than that much o f  it is traditional? Could  we show that 
these regulations are justified as maximizing the public good? 
Suppose we think that the various crimes differ in their harmful- 
ness (perhaps corresponding to the order of  the size o f  penalties 
attached) - although we might well doubt  this - and suppose we 
suggest that these relative sentences might be justified in that 
they provide more deterrence for the more serious crimes. Should 
one say that rape is twice as worthy o f  deterrence as kidnapping 
or assault (twice as bad as an assault breaking both  one's legs?) 
or robbery, three times as wor thy  o f  deterrence as residential 
burglary, and six times as worthy as perjury? 12 This is surely open 
to question. 
Even if  one thinks the order o f  severity in sentences conforms 
roughly to the order of  harmfulness o f  the crime, another step is 
needed to justify the practice of  the criminal law: to explain how 
the public good is maximized by these different sentences. 13 O f  
12 See Michael Davis, "Setting Penalties: What Does Rape Deserve?" 
Law and Philosophy 3 (1984): 61-110. 
13 Some contemporary writers on the criminal law do not take a 
utilitarian view at all. They say general obedience to the law is for the 
public benefit, and obedience to it requires sacrifice on the part of those 
who set personal desires aside so as to conform with the law; those who 
break the law therefore arrogate to themselves an advantage as compared 
with law-abiding citizens, and must in fairness be punished in order to 
rectify this disparity. (This is sometimes called "the fair-play theory.") 
See Herbert Morris, On Guilt and Innocence, 1976, 33-34; and various 
others, e.g., George Sher, Desert (Princeton University Press, 1987); M. 
Davis, "How to Make the Punishment Fit the Crime," Ethics 93 (1983): 
726-52, and "The Relative Independence of Punishment Theory" Law 
and Philosophy 7 (1988-9): 321-50, and "Harm and Retribution," 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 15 (1986): 236-56. A somewhat similar view 
is put forward by Jean Hampton in "The Retributive Idea" in J. Murphy 
and J. Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988). For a critique see R. Wasserstrom in Philosophy and Sodal 
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course, the accused cannot commit another crime if he is in custody, 
but the main justification for the system is its deterrence value, 
that the threat of  a tough sentence reduces the incidence of  crime. 
Does it? Doubtless for some crimes, done for personal gain, when  
the individual may calculate the risks o f  the penalty against the gain 
from the offense: such as murder by a racketeer, insider trading, and 
fraud. But a study by the National Research Council  found that 
the statistics show some correlation between greater reliability o f  
law-enforcement and reduced crime rates, with increased severity 
o f  legal punishment o f  doubtful importance. TM 
It is true that the system of  punishments is in a way educa- 
tional (perhaps by conditioning unpleasant punishment to the idea 
o f  a certain offense). It tells prospective criminals, in a forceful 
way, what society thinks o f  certain offenses - more  than any 
preaching or example - for persons who are already adults. But 
something less than five years in a prison might have this effect! 
(At least, five years in prison seems to me a very long time, and 
Issues, 1980, 139-46; Hyman Gross, "Unfair Advantage and the Price 
of Crime," Wayne Law Review 38 (1987): 1395-411; David Dolinko, 
"Some Thoughts about Retributivism," Ethics 101 (1991): 537-59. The 
theory has puzzling consequences. Does it imply that mere attempts to 
commit a crime should be punished not at all? And is the criminal not 
punished for the particular kind of harm he has done, not on the amount 
of advantage he may have taken? Do law-abiding citizens suffer from 
not permitting themselves to commit murder or rape? Or should not 
all crimes be punished equally, since all are breaches of law? Moreover, 
it must be recalled that not all criminals have been fairly dealt with by 
society, having been raised in poverty, and we must ask if the system of 
law has benefitted them equally. See David Lyons, Ethics and the Rule of 
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), chapter 5; also 
chapter 3. 
14 "Deterrence and Incapacitation: Estimating the Effects of Criminal 
Sanctions on Crime Rates," 1978, reported in S. H. Kadish, S. J. 
Schulhofer, and M. G. Paulsen, Criminal Law and its Processes (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1983), pp. 197-201. See also J. Andenaes, 
"The Morality of Deterrence," reprinted in H. Gross and A. von Hirsch, 
eds, Sentencing (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 191-202. 
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its imposition seems to require justification!) The late Judge Charles 
Wyzanski once told the writer that of  the hundred or so persons 
he had sentenced for embezzlement  in his years as senior judge 
o f  the Federal Court  in Boston, he had given everyone a suspended 
sentence and believed that the effects o f  the cr ime on career, 
publicly known, are deterrence enough. So, do we need a prison 
sentence for this offense? (Perhaps the threat of  some such sentence 
has some additional deterrent  value.) In answer to the question 
of  whether  he would do the same for murder, his reply was roughly 
affirmative, that 80% of  murders are unconnected  with a life o f  
crime, and are committed by persons who are uneducated, unaware 
o f  the standard moral judgment  o f  acts o f  murder, or acting from 
passion, and will never murder again. So what is the point of  long 
sentences? 15 Again, the threat o f  a severe punishment for murder  
may be important to deter those others who commit  murder as part 
o f  a life of  crime. And if the threat is to be effective, the system 
must make good use o f  the threat in many cases. I would think 
that, for most ordinary citizens, deterrence is already at its maximum 
if one thinks one may be discovered, tried, and one's offense pub- 
licized in the newspapers, irrespective o f  any penalty imposed, 
a view seconded by John Braithwaite. 16 (This depends, perhaps, 
on one's status in the community,  and maybe a serious threat is 
necessary in order to induce everyone to reckon his income tax 
correctly. Why  do people who commit  murders really do so? Do 
they give thought to possible legal sanctions?) 
15 Hugo Bedau found that in twelve states, from 1900 to 1976, of 21,646 
persons convicted of murder and subsequently released, only 16 were later 
convicted of homicide. A later nationwide study showed that, between 
1965 and 1974, of 11,404 persons convicted of willful homicide and 
then released, only 34 committed another murder. In Hugo Bedau, ed., 
The Death Penalty in America, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1982), p. 175. See also Anna Quindlen, "Marking Time" New York Times, 
March 11, 1992, A-16. 
16 John Braithwaite, Crime, Shame, and Reintegration (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
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We should note that 90% of  the inmates o f  prisons are men, 
mostly between the ages o f  15 and 25, unmarr ied,  in cities, in 
areas o f  high residential mobility, who have done poorly in school 
and have friendships with criminals, and are at the bot tom of  the 
socio-economic ladder and, if  already a convicted offender, stig- 
matized as such. This fact has implications for what should be 
done to maximize public benefit! What  kind o f  state action/system 
is most likely to prevent further crime from this group? 
If  utilitarian considerations are to be used as a basis for evalu- 
ating the system of  criminal law, either morally, or in line with a 
Benthamite utilitarianism of  the law just as law, with the aim of  
making changes so as to maximize expectable well-being, drastic 
changes seem to be called for, contrary to a currently very influ- 
ential feeling that the laws should be made tougher, more prisons 
built, and the convicted severely punished for what they did. It 
appears to me, however, that the way for the law to go, if  the 
aim is to do what it takes to maximize benefit generally (including 
the benefit o f  the criminals), at least for offenders not already 
commit ted  to a life o f  crime, is (aside from dropping penalties 
and continuing to classify as "offenses" acts which  hardly cause 
harm - like a physician assisting an ill person to commit  suicide, 
when he clearly wants to do so), to reduce radically sentences o f  
imprisonment,  and to make wide use o f  non-pr ison  sentences, 
particularly following European practices and the schedules of  recent 
sentencing commissions like those in Minnesota, say, by the use 
o f  fines (perhaps deterring sex crimes by an enforced fine o f  $5,000, 
or a sum depending on the ability o f  the offender to pay), or this 
in addition to or replaced by various restrictions on the person's 
behavior, such as residence in the communi ty  or commitment  to 
be in one's home (house arrest, perhaps with electronic monitoring) 
most hours o f  the day, or intermit tent  incarceration (say on 
weekends), intensive supervision, extensive communi ty  service (say, 
thirty hours o f  service in place o f  a month  in prison), enrollment 
in a drug program or therapy in the case o f  sex offenses, with 
some training to prepare for a job and assistance in finding one, and 
perhaps a bit o f  education about the point o f  morali ty and the 
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law. M1 this and more is advocated by Norval Morris and Michael 
Tonry in a recent volume. 17 This would also, possibly, be rather 
less expensive than prison sentences. (One might add that some 
changes need to be made in the legal education of  prospective 
judges - perhaps one or more courses in the philosophical foun- 
dations of  morality and the law.) How to get legislative bodies to 
make changes, along lines evidence shows are needed to maximize 
public benefit, as contrasted with the commitment  to make the 
law "tougher", is a serious problem. It may not be easy to convince 
legislators that supervision, therapy, and demands of  public service 
are more likely to benefit the public than being thrust into 
a penitentiary for a few years, but it seems something must be 
done to spread such a conviction. The present system not only 
manifestly fails to maximize the public good, but, from a con- 
science-utilitarian point of  view, is manifestly immoral and failing 
in humanity. 
The foregoing discussion will have made clear that an appraisal 
of  the system of  criminal law is markedly a more complex problem 
than the ones the conscience-utilitarian theory of  morality faces 
in deciding which kinds of  conduct are morally wrong. What the 
rule-utilitarian about morality has to do is simply to determine 
which moral anti-attitudes should be prevalent and taught in view 
of the long-run expectable utilities. There is, of  course, more, when 
the basic requirements conflict. Then one has to think what social 
life would be like if the preference went one way or the other, 
in general. These problems seemingly can be resolved in the same 
way, just by taking thought! 
An appraisal of  the criminal law, just from the point of  view 
of  public benefit, is more demanding - not only requiring decision 
which kind of  offense is worse, but also what society should do 
to maximize social benefit, by imposing and implementing penal- 
17 Between Prison and Probation (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1990). See also Hyman Gross and A. von Hirsch, Sentencing (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1981). 
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ties - something that requires knowledge about the probable effects 
o f  different strategies, knowledge that the average individual does 
not have just from thinking about it, but acquiring, which  demands 
some familiarity wi th  the statistics and psychology of  criminal 
behavior and the effects o f  the penal system. 
Wha t  I am saying is that an unimpass ioned second look,  in 
view of  the facts, is called for, on this segment  o f  the criminal 
law. If  the U.S. system of  education and its system of  health care 
are in need of  reform, how about its system of  criminal law? 
But there is an area of  the criminal law which seems to raise only 
simpler problems. 
III .  J U S T I F I C A T I O N  
The  criminal law considers whether  it may be the case that some 
behavior, forbidden by the statutes (and interpretations) o f  the 
law, is justified in some cases and hence not, finally, a criminal offense 
at all. (There is another  quest ion whe the r  some such behavior  
may be excused, but not  justified. TM) 
It is quite possible that an optimal morality will prescribe ignor- 
ing the normal  first-order moral requirements (like not stealing, 
telling lies) when  following such a rule of  conscience would do a 
serious amount  of  harm. For instance, maybe torture might  be per- 
missible if the destruction of  New York City by a nuclear bomb 
is at stake, at least if  there is some probability that the right person 
is in custody. Normal  morality does, o f  course, recognize avoiding 
harm as a basic moral consideration which normally is stronger than 
most others (if telling the truth would be hurtful, you had better 
not be too squeamish about the truth, while recognizing that in the 
is There is controversy about how "justification" should be defined. 
See Kent Greenawalt, "The Perplexing Borders of Justification and 
Excuse," Columbia Law Review 84 (1984): 1897-1927; also Law and 
Contemporary Problems 49 (1986). For helpful discussion see also B. Sharon 
Byrd, "Wrongdoing and Attribution: Implications Beyond the Justifica- 
tion-excuse Distinction," Wayne Law Review 33 (1987): 1289-342. 
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long run truth is advantageous); but what I am suggesting is that 
if  an action would cause really serious harm, its weight is superior 
to that of  any of  the normal moral prohibitions, which are appraised 
by considering whether  society would be better off if  people were 
normally motivated in a certain way. However, the point here is 
that something like this kind of  thinking is recognized in the law. 
In some cases o f  breach o f  law it is clear that it is better  that 
people do infringe the statutes, e.g., by actions which  strongly 
promote the public goods, such as burning down a house when  
necessary in order to prevent a general conflagration, or running 
a red light in order to rush a seriously ill patient to a hospital. 
Call this a "defense of  necessity." Thus the Model Penal Code (Section 
3.02) says that "Conduc t  which the actor believes to be neces- 
sary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable, 
provided that (a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such 
conduct  is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law 
defining the offense charged . . . .  " It should be noted that this state- 
ment  must be understood carefully, to fit actual legal practice, 
since it does not say that whether  one evil is greater is settled by 
the "bel ief"  of  an agent, but is left to a court, which may account 
avoidance o f  an arrest, or any theft, as a considerable evil. (The 
agent's belief seems relevant only to the effect o f  his avoidance, 
not conclusive about how bad it is.) Moreover, it seems that the 
justification o f  necessity does not  imply, as the foregoing state- 
ment  seems to, a straight act-utilitarian adjudication (= that it is 
always acceptable to do what, on the agent's evidence, will 
maximize the public good) o f  criminal cases. For a thief  cannot 
justify his stealing on the ground that what is stolen is more impor- 
tant to him than to the owner. If  he could, legal protection o f  
property would hardly be possible. So there must be a conscience- 
utilitarian slant to the law, roughly to the effect that a condition 
o f  justification is that a general acceptance of  permissibility of  a given 
type o f  decision would be socially beneficial. Perhaps what the 
Model  Penal Code should say is, at least (for a simple formula- 
tion) that the good which justifies must actually, in the judgment  
o f  court  or jury, be not just greater but that the good of  permis- 
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sibility of  that type o f  action but be greater than the evil o f  the type 
o f  action which the law normally aims to avoid. (But possibly some 
vagueness in this rule is called for, so that different types of  case 
may be treated differently.) Would this coincide with the view 
that (1) normal morality will give considerable weight to harm- 
fulness in deciding the order o f  permissibility o f  various actions, 
but also (2) set aside all this "normal" morality when  the good/evil  
involved is very serious? This issue is doubtless open to debate. 
It is generally supposed that an important implication o f  this pro- 
vision is the right to self-defense. Thus the Model Penal Code states 
that the use o f  force toward "another  person is justifiable when  
the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the 
purpose o f  protecting himself against the use o f  unlawful [my italics] 
force by such other person on the present • ,19 occasion, except that 
deadly force may not be used unless "the agent believes that such 
force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious bodily 
harm, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat 
. . . .  " On  the whole, the availability o f  this kind o f  defense against 
prosecution seems well conceived to augment the public good in 
the long run. For, in the case o f  self-defense, awareness by a poten- 
tial aggressor that force against him is legitimate is itself a deterrent 
factor. This comports with the rule-utilitarian view. 
Professor J. J. Thomson,  in a recent article, 2° argues that the 
19 For some interesting comments see George Fletcher, "Self-defense 
as a Justification of Punishment," Cardozo Law Review 12, 859-66; and 
D. W. Elliott, "Necessity, Duress, and Self-defense," Journal of Criminal 
Law and Criminology 74 (1983): 343-62. 
20 "Self-defense," in Philosophy and Public Affairs 20 (1991): 283-310; 
see also The Realm of Rights (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1990), chap. 14. See Larry Alexander, "Self-defense, Justification, 
and Excuse," Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (1993): 53-66. 
W. D. Ross, in a rather qualified way, seems to hold that a person's 
failure to respect the rights of  others abolishes his own corresponding 
rights. See The Right and the Good (Oxford, 1930), pp. 60-61, also pp. 
54-56. But a person hardly fails to "respect" the rights of others by an 
unintentionally threatening form of behavior. 
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justifiability (whether moral or legal) o f  killing in self-defense lies 
in the fact that every nonaggressor has a right not to be killed, which 
another is violating by a threat he poses. But, she holds, when  a 
person is a threat to your life (intentionally or not), his right not 
to be killed by you vanishes - is forfeited. That is why you may 
defend yourself  by killing him. (This defense, according to her, 
applies to killing a fat man unintentionally falling on you, who is 
sure to kill you if his fall is not  deflected, a case in which,  I 
suggest, an excuse of  duress might be more reasonable.) 
Unlike a utilitarian view of  the law, which would permit  killing 
an aggressor on the ground that this right to kill is a deterrent,  
Thomson's view affirms but does not explain why there is a right 
to kill a person who endangers but is not an unlawful aggressor. 
Thomson's answer seems to be just that we do have such a right 
and that we can see that we do: that is a necessary truth. 21 In this 
she seems to have the support of  the Model Penal Code in an obscure 
and complex clause permitting such a defense - 3.11 (1). This view 
seems to be seconded by George Fletcher, apparently partly in 
deference to Continental  legal theory, according to which "the 
innocent aggressor infringes upon the integrity and autonomy of  
the resister" and therefore the threat's conduct is "wrong and the 
resister's is right. ''22 Doubtless there are some exceptions to my 
suggestion that the attacker must be culpable: the attacker might 
be guiltless because o f  mistake or insanity, and in this case security 
considerations might well prevail, perhaps not  as a justification, 
but at least as excusing on grounds of  duress. 
Dept. of Philosophy, 
University of Michigan (emeritus) 
21 See her 1990, Introduction, pp. 4-5, 15-20, 32-3. 
22 L. A. Alexander, "Justification and Innocent Aggressors," Wayne Law 
Review, 1987, 1177-89, especially 1178-80; George Fletcher, Rethinking 
the Criminal Law. 860-64; and M. Bayles, Principles of Law (Dordrecht: 
R.eidel, 1987), p. 334. 
